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studying the links between market-maker inventories and liquidity have shed considerable light on how
market makers (often modeled as dealers) resolve temporal imbalances in the continuous trading
environment that characterizes most financial markets. In general, inventory models predict that market
makers set ask prices above bid prices, that they lower their quotes when they have very large inventory
positions, and that they may or may not change the magnitude of their quoted spreads as their inventory
changes, depending on whether they are capital constrained or not. Models in which market makers face
capital constraints also offer an explanation of flight to quality, in which the riskiest securities suffer the
greatest liquidity declines. Multi-dealer inventory models predict that relative inventory positions give rise to
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INVENTORY MODELS AND INVENTORY EFFECTS 
 
Abstract 
Traditional economic models of price-setting focus on call-auction markets in which 
all trading occurs simultaneously, at pre-established discrete times, with no market 
makers involved. Such models leave no role for any of the three sources of friction found 
in modern models of market liquidity: inventory, order-processing costs, and adverse 
selection. As market microstructure research has developed, researchers studying the 
links between market-maker inventories and liquidity have shed considerable light on 
how market makers (often modeled as dealers) resolve temporal imbalances in the 
continuous trading environment that characterizes most financial markets. In general, 
inventory models predict that market makers set ask prices above bid prices, that they 
lower their quotes when they have very large inventory positions, and that they may or 
may not change the magnitude of their quoted spreads as their inventory changes, 
depending on whether they are capital constrained or not. Models in which market 
makers face capital constraints also offer an explanation of flight to quality, in which the 
riskiest securities suffer the greatest liquidity declines. Multi-dealer inventory models 
predict that relative inventory positions give rise to interdealer trading and determine 
which dealers have the best (lowest ask or highest bid) quotes in a market. These 
predictions have been tested and largely borne out in empirical studies to date.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Traditional economic models of price-setting focus on call-auction markets in which 
all trading occurs simultaneously, at pre-established discrete times, with no market 
makers involved. Such models leave no role for any of the three sources of friction found 
in modern models of market liquidity: inventory, order-processing costs, and adverse 
selection. As market microstructure research has developed, researchers studying the 
links between inventories and liquidity have shed considerable light on how market 
makers resolve temporal imbalances in the continuous trading environment that 
characterizes most financial markets.  
 
LINKING INVENTORIES AND LIQUIDITY 
The study of how inventories affect pricing and liquidity in financial markets began 
with the work of Garman [6]. Garman models continuous trading with a market maker, or 
dealer, who smoothes out temporary imbalances in other traders’ orders to buy and sell 
securities. In Garman’s model there is a single risk-neutral, monopolistic dealer who 
faces stochastic order arrival. The dealer has no ability to borrow either cash or securities, 
and he sets prices at which he is willing to sell (ask price) and buy (bid price) only once, 
before trading begins. The dealer’s objective is to maximize his expected profit per unit 
of time subject to avoiding bankruptcy or failure. This formulation gives rise to a classic 
gambler’s ruin problem. By setting his ask price higher than his bid price (a positive bid-
ask spread), the dealer protects himself from certain failure, although he still faces a 
positive probability of failure. A key contribution of Garman’s model is the idea that a 
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dealer’s inventory affects his viability. A limitation of his model is that all prices are set 
before trading begins; the dealer cannot adjust his prices as his inventory changes.  
 
INVENTORY MODELS WITH NO POSSIBILITY OF DEALER FAILURE  
Amihud and Mendelson [1] build on Garman’s intuition to study how a dealer 
changes his prices as his inventory changes, explicitly incorporating inventory into the 
dealer’s pricing problem. As in Garman’s model, there is a single risk-neutral, 
monopolistic dealer whose objective is to maximize expected profit, but Amihud and 
Mendelson assume that inventory is bounded above and below by exogenous parameters, 
eliminating the possibility of dealer failure. This allows a tighter focus on the dealer’s 
optimization problem. This model incorporates a semi-Markov process in which 
inventory is the state variable. The decision variables (bid and ask prices) depend on the 
level of the state variable (inventory) – thus the bid and ask prices change over time as 
the level of inventory changes. Amihud and Mendelson’s model predicts that the dealer’s 
optimal ask price is above his bid price, but in this model the positive spread reflects the 
dealer’s market power. (Extending the model to include competitive dealers would drive 
the spread to zero.) In addition, Amihud and Mendelson find that the dealer has a 
preferred or target inventory position, and he adjusts his prices to return to his target 
inventory. If the dealer is too long, to reduce inventory towards his target level he lowers 
both the bid and ask prices to induce other traders to buy. The reverse is true if the dealer 
is below his target inventory: To raise inventory towards its target level the market maker 
raises both the bid and ask prices to induce other traders to sell. Amihud and Mendelson’s 
model thus predicts that the level of bid and ask prices is a monotonically decreasing 
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function of the dealer’s inventory. In the special case of linear supply and demand, higher 
inventory leads to wider spreads.  
The models of Stoll [19] and Ho and Stoll [10, 11] maintain the assumption that the 
dealer cannot go bankrupt, but they focus on how a risk-averse dealer’s inventory, order-
processing costs, and adverse selection risk affect his pricing. The dealer is willing to 
alter his portfolio away from his desired position in order to accommodate the trading 
desires of others. The dealer is risk averse and cannot hedge his inventory exposure, so he 
must be compensated for bearing the risk of changing his portfolio from his target level. 
In these models the spread between bid and ask prices arises as compensation for the 
portfolio risk borne by a risk-averse dealer. Inventory causes the dealer to move both bid 
and ask prices up (if he is below his target portfolio) or down (if he is above his target 
portfolio) by the same amount, so inventory affects the level of bid and ask prices but not 
the magnitude of the spread between them. But here the spread reflects dealer risk 
aversion, rather than market power as in Amihud and Mendelson [1]. Ho and Stoll [10, 
11] demonstrate that the intuition of inventory affecting a dealer’s quote levels but not the 
magnitude of his spread is robust to multi-period and multi-dealer configurations. In a 
multi-dealer setting, Ho and Stoll [11] further predict that relative inventory positions 
among dealers determine the amount of interdealer trading.  
 
INVENTORY MODELS WITH CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS 
Most of the classical inventory models [1, 10, 11, 16, 19] assume either explicitly or 
implicitly that dealers have access to unlimited additional capital. Recent work by 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2] and Gromb and Vayanos [7] relaxes this assumption, 
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examining how liquidity provision is affected by the inventory of dealers or arbitrageurs 
who face capital constraints.   
Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2] construct a model linking an asset’s market liquidity 
with market makers’ funding, explicitly acknowledging that market makers generally 
cannot raise new capital instantly. In this model market makers are risk-neutral and their 
objective is to maximize final wealth, subject to the constraint that the total margin (the 
amount of capital required to finance their inventory positions) cannot exceed their 
capital. Brunnermeier and Pedersen show that when market makers’ margin requirements 
approach their available capital, market makers provide less liquidity to the market and 
bid-ask spreads widen. This model thus predicts that very large inventory positions lead 
to wider spreads, in contrast to the capital-unconstrained models in which inventories 
have no effect on the magnitude of bid-ask spreads. Further, Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
predict that when large inventory positions push market makers close to their capital 
limits, market makers provide liquidity mostly in lower-risk securities, causing a “flight 
to quality” in which risky securities become especially illiquid.  
 Similar predictions can be obtained from the Gromb and Vayanos [7] capital-
constraints model, although their main predictions concern the welfare implications of 
capital-constrained market makers.   
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON INVENTORY EFFECTS 
Models of how market maker inventories affect pricing and liquidity in financial 
markets all predict that a market maker will set his ask price above his bid price for 
reasons including bankruptcy risk (Garman [6]), market power (Amihud & Mendelson 
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[1]), and risk aversion (Stoll [19], Ho & Stoll [10, 11]). This prediction of a positive bid-
ask spread is borne out by observations in virtually all financial markets.  
All of the inventory models also predict that inventories affect the level of bid and ask 
prices, with market makers lowering prices to reduce their inventory when they hold 
large positions and raising prices when their inventory positions are low or negative. 
Lyons [12] and Cao, Evans, and Lyons [3] find evidence of such inventory-induced quote 
shading in the foreign exchange market, as do Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman [5] in 
the S&P500 index options market. However, in the futures market, Manaster and Mann 
[15] find that futures market makers (who differ somewhat from the typical dealer in 
inventory models) actually raise their prices when they have larger inventory positions, in 
contradiction of the inventory models’ prediction. Using London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
data, Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan [8], Reiss and Werner [18], and Naik and Yadav 
[17] find support for market makers’ controlling risk by mean-reverting their inventory 
positions towards a target level. Hasbrouck and Sofianos [9] and Madhavan and Sofianos 
[14] find evidence that specialists on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) have 
preferred inventory positions and that their inventories affect prices, but Madhavan and 
Smidt [13] also find that specialist inventories deviate from their target levels for periods 
as long as several weeks.  
Several researchers analyze the link between inventories and liquidity suggested by 
inventory models. Consistent with the predictions of Ho and Stoll [11] for a market with 
competitive dealers, Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan [8] and Reiss and Werner [18] find 
that differences in inventories across dealers on the LSE affect the extent of interdealer 
trading, but that individual dealer inventories do not affect the magnitude of each dealer’s 
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quoted spread intraday. On an interday level, Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, 
Moulton, and Seasholes [4] find that large NYSE specialist inventories lead to wider 
spreads, consistent with the predictions of capital-constraints models such as 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2]. Comerton-Forde et al. [4] also find evidence that when 
NYSE specialist inventories are particularly high, spreads widen more for high-risk than 
for low-risk stocks, supporting Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s [2] inventory explanation 
for flight to quality. 
 
SUMMARY 
Dealer inventory was among the first market frictions studied by market 
microstructure theorists. Inventory models predict that dealers set ask prices above bid 
prices, that they lower their quotes when they have very large inventory positions, and 
that they may or may not change the magnitude of their quoted spreads as their inventory 
changes, depending on the particular modeling assumptions. Multi-dealer inventory 
models further predict that relative inventory positions give rise to interdealer trading and 
determine which dealers have the best (lowest ask or highest bid) quotes in a market. 
These predictions have been tested and largely borne out in empirical studies to date, but 
the difficulty of obtaining data on dealer inventories has limited researchers’ ability to 
test the models in some of the largest dealer markets, such as the fixed income market.    
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